COMMENTS

Arbitrating Statutory Rights in the Union
Setting: Breaking the Collective Interest
Problem Without Damaging Labor Relations
Albert Y. Kimt
INTRODUCTION

As judicial caseloads have risen, arbitration and other forms
of alternative dispute resolution have become popular, especially
as methods for the resolution of employer-employee disputes.' In
an attempt to lessen litigation expenses and speed up the resolution of disputes, employers and employees have moved away from
litigation and toward predispute mandatory arbitration agreements.2 With the recent expansion of statutory protection against
discrimination in the workplace, discrimination claims will place
even more pressure on already crowded court dockets, further intensifying the trend toward finding alternatives to litigation.3
However, despite the wide-ranging use of binding commercial arbitration, federal courts traditionally refused to enforce agreements mandating the arbitration of statutory employment dis-
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1 See Stephen W. Skrainka, The Utility of Arbitration Agreements in Employment
Manuals and Collective BargainingAgreements for Resolving Civil Rights, Age and ADA
Claims, 37 SLU L Rev 985, 992-93 (1993) (setting forth advantages of arbitration over litigation and advocating arbitration of statutory discrimination claims in the collective bargaining context).
2 Id.
3 Id at 993.
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crimination claims.4 Courts viewed such claims as too important
to entrust to final arbitration.5
In the watershed case of Gilmer v Interstate/JohnsonLane
Corp,' the Supreme Court punctured the judicial presumption
that arbitration was an inadequate forum for statutory discrimination claims. The Court ruled that because the applicable arbitration procedures met certain due process requirements, they
were an adequate substitute for litigation, even when statutory
employment discrimination claims were at issue.7 Gilmer, along
with previous Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Federal
Arbitration Act8 as establishing a broad presumption of arbitrability,9 gave lower courts the authority they needed to enforce
predispute mandatory arbitration clauses covering Title VII,'
Age Discrimination in Employment
Act ("ADEA7),"
and Ameri13
2
cans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") claims.
But while courts have enforced individual agreements to arbitrate statutory claims, they have been reluctant to do the same
with respect to agreements contained in collective bargaining
contracts because of the unique dangers such agreements pose to
minority rights. 4 For example, unlike her counterpart in the in' See, for example, Alford v Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc, 905 F2d 104, 105 (5th Cir
1990), vacated, 500 US 930 (1991); Utley v Goldman Sachs & Co, 883 F2d 184, 187 (1st
Cir 1989).
' See, for example, Alford, 905 F2d at 106-07; Swenson v Management Recruiters International,Inc,858 F2d 1304, 1306-07 (8th Cir 1988).
6 500 US 20 (1991).
Id at 30-32.
Pub L No 80-282, 61 Stat 669 (1947), codified as amended at 9 USC §§ 1 et seq
(1994).
' See Shearson/AmericanExpress, Inc v McMahon, 482 US 220, 238-42 (1987) (holding that Securities Exchange Act and RICO claims are arbitrable); Mitsubishi Motors Corp
v Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc, 473 US 614, 628-29 (1985) (establishing broad presumption of arbitrability and subjecting antitrust dispute to binding arbitration); Moses H.
Cone MemorialHospital v Mercury Construction Corp, 460 US 1, 24-25 (1983) (interpreting the Federal Arbitration Act to mandate that courts resolve doubts regarding arbitrability in favor of arbitration).
" Pub L No 88-352, 78 Stat 253 (1964), codified as amended at 42 USC §§ 2000e et seq
(1994).
' Pub L No 90-202, 81 Stat 602 (1967), codified as amended at 29 USCA §§ 621 et seq
(West 1985 & Supp 1997).
Pub L No 101-336, 104 Stat 327 (1990), codified as amended at 42 USC §§ 12101 et
seq (1994).
' See, for example, Austin v Owens-Brockway Glass Container,Inc, 78 F3d 875, 88586 (4th Cir) (enforcing clause covering Title VII and ADA claims), cert denied, 117 S Ct
432 (1996); Bender v A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc, 971 F2d 698, 700 (11th Cir 1992) (enforcing clause covering Title VII claim); Mago v Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc, 956 F2d
932, 935 (9th Cir 1992) (enforcing clause covering Title VII claim); Crawfordv West Jersey
Health Systems (Vorhees Division), 847 F Supp 1232, 1242 n 13 (D NJ 1994) (finding Title
VII and ADEA claims arbitable).
" See, for example, Prynerv Tractor Supply Co, 109 F3d 354, 363-64 (7th Cir), cert
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dividual employment arbitration setting, the union employee
cannot control the arbitration proceedings. Furthermore, a potential conflict exists between a union's duty to its members collectively and a single member's interest in seeing her claim redressed."i This "collective interest problem" is not present in the

individual arbitration context.
Circuit courts disagree about whether the potential conflict
created by this collective interest problem should prevent the enforcement of mandatory labor arbitration clauses. The Fourth
Circuit's recent decision in Austin v Owens-Brockway Glass Container,Inc 6 leads the growing trend to enforce mandatory arbitration clauses of statutory claims. The court ruled that a mandatory arbitration clause in a collective bargaining agreement must
be enforced, even with respect to Title VII and ADA claims. 7 The
court glossed over the collective interest problem in the union setting, focusing instead on the Gilmer presumption of arbitrability.'8 The Seventh Circuit, however, disagreed with the reasoning
in Austin. In its decision in Pryner v Tractor Supply Co, 9 the
court focused on the collective interest problem in labor arbitration and held that a union could not agree to arbitrate members'
statutory rights if the union controlled the grievance process.
This Comment argues that because it did not adequately address the collective interest problem-a problem of paramount
concern when individual statutory discrimination rights are at
stake-the Fourth Circuit reached the wrong conclusion in Ausdenied, 118 S Ct 294 (1997); Tran v Tran, 54 F3d 115, 117-18 (2d Cir 1995), cert denied,
116 S Ct 1415 (1996); Bynes v Ahrenkiel Ship Management, (US) Inc, 944 F Supp 485,
487-88 (W D La 1996); Bush v CarrierAir Conditioning,940 F Supp 1040, 1048-46 (E D
Tex 1996); Jackson v Quanex Corp, 889 F Supp 1007, 1010-12 (E D Mich 1995); Randolph
v Cooper Industries,879 F Supp 518, 520-23 (W D Pa 1994); Block v Art Iron, Inc, 866 F
Supp 380, 385-87 (N D Ind 1994); Adams v BurlingtonNorthern RailroadCo, 843 F Supp
686, 690-91 (D Kan 1994).
"See Alexander v Gardner-DenverCo, 415 US 36, 58 n 19 (1974). Additionally, the labor arbitrator's approach is markedly different from that of an individual employment arbitrator. Traditionally, labor arbitrators have focused on interpreting the contractual
terms of the collective bargaining agreement, deliberately ignoring public external law
and thus leaving the employee free to litigate her statutory claims in court. See id at 5354. See also David E. Feller, Arbitration and the External Law Revisited, 37 SLU L Rev
973, 980 (1993) (arguing that arbitrators are not competent to apply external law); Barnard D. Meltzer, Labor Arbitrationand Discrimination:The Parties'Process and the Public's Purposes, 43 U Chi L Rev 724, 728-38 (1976) (arguing that arbitrators should enforce
only contractual rights by comparing that stance to two other extremes: arbitrators who
directly apply the law and arbitrators who will not decide any issue also covered by external law).
"78 F3d 875 (4th Cir), cert denied, 117 S Ct 482 (1996).
"Id at 885-86.
"See id at 882 n 2.
109 F3d 354,362-63 (7th Cir), cert denied, 118 S Ct 294 (1997).
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tin. In contrast, the Seventh Circuit determined that the collective interest problem present in labor arbitration was dispositive.2' However, the solution the Seventh Circuit put forth-allowing the plaintiff to pursue arbitration and a court suit simultaneously-also is unsatisfactory. This Comment argues that the
mandatory labor arbitration of discrimination claims is possible
and desirable both for efficiency reasons and to keep the institution of labor arbitration as the centerpiece of dispute resolution.
As this Comment will explain, final and binding arbitration of
statutory employment discrimination disputes should occur only
when certain minimum procedural safeguards are in place and
when employees can individually control the dispute settlement
mechanism.2 '
Part I of this Comment briefly reviews the institution of labor arbitration and early judicial hostility toward arbitration of
statutory claims. Part II outlines the recent trend toward accepting arbitral proceedings as an adequate substitute for courtbased litigation, even when the dispute concerns individual
statutory rights. Part Im discusses the important distinctions between labor arbitration through collective bargaining agreements
and individual employment arbitration. It concludes that collective interest problems within the labor arbitration process render
the current system unsuitable for final and binding resolution of
statutory discrimination disputes. Finally, Part IV proposes a
two-track labor arbitration mechanism under which individual
union members would have greater freedom to control statutory
discrimination claims. By implementing this procedure, employers could address judicial concerns over the collective interest
problem while still going forward with binding arbitration of
statutory claims.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

In the 1950s, the Supreme Court strongly endorsed labor arbitration. By the 1970s and the early 1980s, however, the Court
developed a more suspicious attitude regarding the arbitration of
statutory claims. The Court's attitude began to change back
Id at 362.
considerable commentary has addressed the relative merits of the arbitral forum and the courthouse, less has been written on enforcing mandatory arbitration agreements in collective bargaining contracts. Furthermore, courts only recently have begun
looking at the possibility of modifying labor arbitration procedures to allow enforcement of
such clauses. This Comment explores new territory by focusing on the collective interest
problem in labor arbitration and recommending modifications to allow mandatory arbitration of statutory claims.
21 While
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again, though, in the late 1980s. The Court eventually came
nearly full circle in 1991 with its decision in Gilmer to allow
binding arbitration of an individual statutory discrimination
claim.' In order to recognize the limited reach of the current judicial presumption of arbitrability, specifically that union members cannot be forced to arbitrate statutory claims, it is important
to examine this evolution in the theoretical underpinnings of arbitration and the arbitration of statutory rights.
A. The Broad Presumption of Labor Arbitrability
In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the Supreme Court cemented the role of arbitration in employer-union relations with
its decisions in Textile Workers Union v Lincoln Mills' and the
Steelworkers cases.' In Lincoln Mills, the Court held that Section
301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 5 allowed
federal courts to enforce agreements between employers and unions to arbitrate grievance disputes.26 Relying on the Act's legislative history, the Court found that an arbitration clause serves as
the quid pro quo for a union's agreement not to strike,2 7 thus invalidating the common law rule against enforcement of arbitration agreements."
Having established the viability of labor arbitration in Lincoln Mills, the Court strengthened the system in the Steelworkers
cases. In United Steelworkers v American Manufacturing Co,'
the Court held that when the union and the employer have
agreed to arbitrate all disputes, a court's only role is "to ascertain[ ] whether. the party seeking arbitration is making a claim
which on its face is governed by the contract." Any larger role
would interfere with the collective bargaining agreement and reduce its "stabilizing influence" on industrial relations."0 Consequently, the Court prescribed that judges should not evaluate

See 500 US at 23.
353 US 448 (1957).
United Steelworkers v Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp, 363 US 593 (1960); United
Steelworkers v Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co, 363 US 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v
American ManufacturingCo, 363 US 564 (1960).
Pub L No 80-101, 61 Stat 156 (1947), codified at 29 USC § 185 (1994).
See 353 US at 455.
See id at 455-56. In Lincoln Mills, the employer denied several assignment grievances filed by the union. The union then requested arbitration, the final step in the agreed
upon grievance procedures. After the employer denied the arbitration request, the union
fied suit in federal court to compel arbitration. Id at 449.
' See id at 456.
2363
US 564, 567-68 (1960).
' Id at 567.

The University of ChicagoLaw Review

[65:225

grievances on the merits but instead should leave ultimate resolution to the arbitral panel."' In United Steelworkers v Warrior &
Gulf Navigation Co, 2 the Court emphasized that a collective bargaining agreement was an "effort to erect a system of industrial
self-government." Accordingly, the sweep of arbitration agreements should reach broadly; all "[d]oubts should be resolved in
favor of coverage." 3 Supported by these rulings, the internal dispute resolution mechanism became the centerpiece of industrial
relations.
B. The Exception for Statutory Discrimination Claims
Four years after the Steelworkers cases, Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,' guaranteeing employees
freedom from discriminatory employment practices.35 In Alexander v Gardner-DenverCo,"5 the Supreme Court began a new era
in labor arbitration by holding that statutory employment discrimination rights trump contractual provisions for handling disputes in a collective bargaining agreement. Specifically, the Court
ruled that a union member could not be estopped from filing a Title VII suit after an adverse arbitral award.
The Alexander Court based its ruling on statutory language,
legislative intent, the role of the labor arbitrator, the conflict between the interest of the union and the individual employee, and
the procedural inadequacies of arbitration. First, the Court found
that both the language and legislative history of Title VII indicated that Congress sought to enact a system of overlapping
remedies, with the courts as the ultimate enforcer.3 8 According to
the Alexander court, Congress viewed the rights conferred by Title VII as so important that it would violate the purpose of the
statute to allow their prospective waiver.39
Second, the Court found that the role of a labor arbitrator
was to interpret the collective bargaining agreement and enforce
"See id at 569 ("When the judiciary undertakes to determine the merits of a grievance under the guise of interpreting the grievance procedure of collective bargaining
agreements, it usurps a function which under that regime is entrusted to the arbitration
tribunal.").
3863 US 574, 580 (1960).
Id at 583.
,Pub L No 88-352, 78 Stat 253 (1964), codified as amended at 42 USC §§ 2000e et seq
(1994).
" 42 USC § 2000e-2(a).
415 US 36, 51-52 (1974).
See id at 52.
Id at 47-49.
Id at 51-52.
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contractual rights, not to apply public law-traditionally considered to be the sole province of the judiciary. 0 While unions were
allowed to bargain on issues of collective action such as no-strike
agreements, the Court found Title VII rights to be individual in
nature and therefore inappropriate subjects for collective bargaining.4 Because the union had exclusive control of the grievance process, individual interests in being free from discrimination potentially could be sacrificed for the collective good of all
employees.
Finally, the Court felt that the informal nature of arbitration
made it an unsuitable forum for resolving statutory claims.4 2
Rather than directly address arbitration's deficiencies, the Court
effectively chose to remove statutory claims from the system entirely. The Court found that requiring arbitration to mirror litigation would diminish its benefits as a cheaper and faster method
of dispute resolution.' Instead, the existing grievance process
could continue to resolve nonstatutory claims while litigation
handled statutory disputes."
The Court extended this dichotomy to claims under the Fair
Labor Standards Act45 in Barrentinev Arkansas-Best FreightSystem, Inc"6 and Section 1983 in McDonald v City of West Branch."
In both cases, the Court held that grievance arbitration mandated by a collective bargaining agreement did not preclude the
, Id at 52-54. There is continuing controversy over whether labor arbitrators should
consider external law in adjudicating grievances. See Sara Adler, Arbitration and the
Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 37 SLU L Rev 1005, 1014 (1993) (arguing that asking labor arbitrators to apply external law damages the perception of labor arbitrators as specialists in the law of the shop). See generally Feller, 37 SLU L Rev 973 (cited in note 15)
(arguing that applying external law may result in increased judicial review, thus destroying the unique nature of labor arbitration as a substitute for industrial strife). But
see Stephen L. Hayford and Anthony V. Sinicropi, The Labor Contract and External Law:
Revisiting the Arbitrator's Scope of Authority, 1993 J Dispute Resolution 249, 277-87
(1993) (recommending that arbitrators apply external law more aggressively in order to
keep labor arbitration a viable institution). This important topic deserves expanded attention, but is beyond the scope of this Comment. This Comment assumes that labor arbitrators, like employment arbitrators, may and should consider public law in their deliberations.
1 See Alexander, 415 US at 58 n 19 ("In arbitration, as in the collective-bargaining
process, the interests of the individual employee may be subordinated to the collective interests of all employees in the bargaining unit."). For instance, union representatives
could decline to pursue a discrimination claim in order to stay in the employer's good
graces.
, See id at 56-58. Examples of such informal procedures include arbitration's limited
fact finding and lack of mandatory written opinions. Id.
Id at 59.
"Id at 50, 52-54, 59-60.
'
52 Stat 1060 (1938), codified as amended at 29 USC §§ 201 et seq (1994).
450 US 728, 737-45 (1981).
466 US 284, 288-92 (1984).
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employee from litigating the corresponding federal statutory

claims.4"
This line of cases highlights the collective interest problem
between collective bargaining and statutes protecting employees'
individual rights. As the Court explained, even if the employee
has a valid claim, the union in good faith and without breaching
its duty of fair representation can choose not to pursue the claim
vigorously in order to get the best deal for all of its members.4 9
This collective interest problem arises because the union, not the
employee, contracts with the employer. Thus, in labor arbitration,
"the proceedings before, during, and after the hearing, are structured by the union and employer parties."50 The employees choose
to pool their economic strength to receive collective benefits, but
by doing so they accede to majority rule."
In the union system, therefore, there is a danger that individual interests may be subsumed for the benefit of the majority5 2
(subject to the union's duty of fair representation).5 3 This result
can have serious implications for union members with individual
grievances. For example, the union may bar the employee from
bringing his own attorney to the arbitration hearing."4 More generally, the union may choose to settle the dispute with the employer before it reaches binding arbitration.5 5 Settling does not
necessarily breach the union's duty of fair representation because
the union holds a strong interest in preserving the arbitration
machinery for nonfrivolous disputes.5 6
McDonald, 466 US at 292; Barrentine,450 US at 745.
See Barrentine,450 US at 742.
Reginald Alleyne, Statutory DiscriminationClaims:Rights 'Waived" and Lost in the
ArbitrationForum, 13 Hofstra Labor L J 381, 407 (1996).
5 Garciav Zenith Electronics Corp, 58 F3d 1171, 1175-76 (7th Cir 1995).
See id at 1176, quoting Seymour v Olin Corp, 666 F2d 202, 208 (5th Cir 1982) ("(A]
union is accorded considerable discretion in dealing with grievance matters, and it may
consider the interests of all its members when deciding whether or not to press the claims
of an individual employee."). See also Barrentine, 450 US at 742 ("A union balancing individual and collective interests might validly permit some employees' statutorily granted
wage and hour benefits to be sacrificed if an alternative expenditure of resources would
result in increased benefits for workers in the bargaining unit as a whole.").
"See note 135 and accompanying text for a brief discussion of the union's duty of fair
representation.
-' See Garcia,58 F3d at 1179-80; Castelli v DouglasAircraft Co, 752 F2d 1480, 1483
(9th Cir 1985).
"See Cole v Burns InternationalSecurity Services, 105 F3d 1465, 1478-79 (DC Cir
1997) (finding that collective bargaining agreement grievance proceedings "almost invariably mean[ ] that the union controls the presentation of the statutory issue to the arbitrator. Thus, the [Alexander] Court knew that arbitration might not be fair to the individual employee, because ... the union's interests are not necessarily the same as the employee's interests, especially with respect to a claim of employment discrimination.").
"See Vaca v Sipes, 386 US 171, 191-92 (1967). See also Pryner,109 F3d at 362 ("[T]he
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Following the Court's decision in Alexander, lower courts
ruled that statutory employment discrimination suits were neither precluded by prior arbitration nor subject to a prerequisite of
an arbitration hearing before the individual employee could file
suit in federal court.5" For example, one First Circuit case concerned a broad mandatory arbitration clause contained in a securities industry registration application, the completion of which
was required as a condition of employment."s The First Circuit
dismissed the difference between individual employment arbitration and a collective bargaining agreement grievance mechanism
and focused instead on the Alexander Court's holding that Title
VII gives ultimate enforcement responsibility to the courts."9 According to the First Circuit, the congressional intent behind Title
VII to give plenary enforcement power to the judiciary defeated
any general presumption of arbitrability stemming from the Federal Arbitration Act. s"
Because of the "strong legislative intent" argument, lower
courts did not address the collective interest problem inherent in
labor arbitration. Alexander seemed to stand for a general prohibition on final arbitration of statutory discrimination claims, so
any differences between the collective bargaining agreement and
individual arbitration systems were irrelevant. In 1991, however,
the Supreme Court brought these differences to the forefront of
arbitration jurisprudence.

union has broad discretion as to whether or not to prosecute a grievance. It may take into
account tactical and strategic factors such as its limited resources ... just as other 'prosecutors' must do, as well as its desire to maintain harmonious relations among the workers
and between them and the employer."). But see Robert A. Gorman, The Gilmer Decision
and the PrivateArbitration of Public-Law Disputes, 1995 U IMlL Rev 635, 675 n 128
("[T]here was not the slightest evidence that the union [in the Alexander case] or the unions in its 'progeny' cases were any less than ardent, and the Court has given no reason to
believe that unions generally have conflicting interests in collective agreement cases that
raise public law issues.").
' See, for example, Utley v Goldman Sachs & Co, 883 F2d at 187 (holding that employee was not required to arbitrate before filing suit despite mandatory arbitration clause
in securities registration application); Swenson v Management Recruiters International,
Inc, 858 F2d 1304, 1305-07 (8th Cir 1988) (Title VII claims are not subject to arbitration
despite clause in employee contract.).
Utley, 883 F2d at 185.
See id at 185-87.
Id, citingAlexander,415 US at 45,56.
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II. RETURNING TO THE PRESUMPTION OF ARBITRABILITY
A. The Gilmer Shift
In Gilmer v Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp, 1 the Supreme
Court compelled arbitration of an ADEA claim, thus rejecting the
general understanding that statutory discrimination claims could
never be subject to mandatory final arbitration. The Court's
holding, while consistent with its decisions in the 1980s finding
mandatory arbitration of commercial statutory claims permissible, 2 represented a significant shift away from the doctrine of Alexander, Barrentine,and McDonald, which did not allow compulsory arbitration of individual statutory discrimination claims.
The Gilmer Court ruled that an ADEA claim was subject to
compulsory arbitration as outlined in a securities industry registration application. The Court first applied a presumption of arbitrability," and then looked to see whether anything overcame
this presumption."4 The Court found no express legislative intent
in the language and history of the ADEA to prevent waiver of the
right to sue."5 Additionally, the Court found no "inherent inconsistency" between the fundamental purposes of the ADEA and
arbitration.6" Finally, the Court determined that the applicable
New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE") arbitration rules provided
sufficient procedural safeguards for the plaintiff and that arbitrators had the power to issue equitable relief. 7 Consequently, the
Court found that arbitration was an adequate substitute for litigation.6

The Gilmer Court distinguished Alexander and its progeny in
a number of important ways. First, Gilmer involved enforcement
of an arbitration agreement, while Alexander was concerned with
the preclusive effect of an arbitration award.69 Second, while the
employee in Gilmer had agreed to arbitrate statutory claims, the
61 500 US 20, 23 (1991).

See Rodriguez de Quijas v Shearson/American Express, Inc, 490 US 477, 481-84
(1989) (holding that a claim arising under the Securities Act of 1933 is subject to the
binding arbitration clause contained in customer service agreement); Mitsubishi Motors
Corp v Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc, 473 US 614, 628-29 (1985) (holding that Sherman

Act claims are arbitrable).
Gilmer, 500 US at 26.
See id at 26-35. Of course, arbitration clauses in contracts may be ruled unenforceable on traditional contract grounds, such as contracts of adhesion or unconscionability.
See id at 33.
See id at 29.
See id at 27-28.
See id at 30-32.
Id.
Id at 35.
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agreement in Alexander covered only contract-based disputes. 0
Third, and most importantly for this Comment's analysis, because the employee in Gilmer had individually signed the registration application and maintained control of the grievance proceedings, there was no collective interest problem.7
Lower courts quickly extended Gilmer's analysis to Title VII 2
and ADA claims.73 In Willis v Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc, 4 the
Sixth Circuit quoted Gilmer extensively in finding that the Supreme Court "has rejected that Title VII precludes an arbitral forum from handling such claims if a party agrees to submit all
statutory claims to arbitration." The Ninth Circuit has held that
binding arbitration clauses for employment discrimination claims
are enforceable as long as the employee has "knowingly agreed to
submit such disputes to arbitration."75
It should be emphasized, however, that Gilmer involved an
individual arbitration contract, not a collective bargaining
agreement. Courts must discern how far Gilmer went in returning the judiciary to a broad general presumption of arbitrability
in the labor arbitration setting. Despite the increased enforcement of mandatory arbitration clauses in securities registrations
and individual employment contracts," some courts have recognized that Alexander's collective interest concern still applies to
the union sector. Thus, the Second Circuit has ruled that a union
member does not have to exhaust his arbitration remedies before
filing a Fair Labor Standards Act claim.77 The court noted the
" Id. Even if the arbitration clause in Alexander had included an agreement to arbitrate statutory claims, the collective interest problem still would exist. See notes 15 and
40 for a brief discussion on the labor arbitrator's role in resolving statutory claims.
71 Id at 35.
See, for example, Willis v Dean WitterReynolds, Inc, 948 F2d 305 (6th Cir 1991).
See, for example, Gateson v ASLK-Bank, NV!CGER-Banque SA, 1995 US Dist
LEXIS 9004 (S D NY 1995); Solomon v Duke University, 850 F Supp 372 (M D NC 1993).

7,

948 F2d 305, 309 (6th Cir 1991).

"' PrudentialInsurance Company ofAmerica v Lai, 42 F3d 1299, 1305 (9th Cir 1994),
cert denied, 516 US 812 (1995) (holding that since arbitration clause did not describe the
types of disputes covered, no knowing waiver of statutory remedies occurred).
" In an ongoing postscript to the Gilmer decision, the National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD") revised its registration form in the summer of 1997, removing the
mandatory arbitration clause. See Susan J. McGolrick, ProposedChange in NASD's Policy
Moves Debate on MandatoryArbitration,156 Labor Rel Rep 40, 41 (Sept 8, 1997). Pending
approval of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the new policy would allow employees either to enter into individual arbitration agreements with employers or to reserve the
right to file court cases for statutory discrimination claims. Id. The National Labor Relations Board and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") also have
taken a stance against predispute mandatory arbitration clauses. See Donna Meredith
Matthews, Note, Employment Law After Gilmer: Compulsory Arbitrationof Statutory AntidiscriminationRights, 18 Berk J Empl & Labor L 347, 356-59 (1997).
"See Tran v Tran, 54 F3d 115, 117-18 (2d Cir 1995).
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collective interest problem in the union context and recognized
that78Gilmer expressly avoided overruling Alexander and its progeny.

B. Gilmer's Procedural Requirements
Although the Supreme Court now has accepted that statutory discrimination claims may be arbitrated in certain instances, 79 the Court also has noted that not all arbitration agreements are enforceable. Gilmer established a procedural baseline
against which arbitration proceedings must be judged."
First, there must be protections against biased arbitral pan81
els. The NYSE arbitration rules at issue in Gilmer provided
such protection: the arbitrators must reveal their employment
histories and the parties are allowed peremptory and for cause
challenges against potential arbitrators. 2 In addition, the NYSE
rules require arbitrators to disclose any circumstances that might
lead them to issue biased decisions.8 3 The Gilmer Court also observed that the Federal Arbitration Act gives judges the power of
reversal in the event of partiality or corruption on the part of the
arbitrators."
Second, minimal discovery procedures must be in place. 5 Because arbitration is more streamlined than litigation, discovery
procedures will not be as extensive as those set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." However, the arbitrators are not
bound by the Federal Rules of Evidence, and the Court concluded
that this extra freedom could act as a counterweight to the reduced discovery opportunities. 7
The Supreme Court rejected the contention that procedural
fairness would be compromised because arbitrators often do not
release written opinions." The employee in Gilmer claimed that a
lack of written opinions hinders appellate review, prevents pub-

See id.
See Cole v Burns InternationalSecurity Services, 105 F3d 1465, 1478 (DC Cir 1997)
("The Supreme Court now has made clear that, as a general rule, statutory claims are
fully subject to binding arbitration, at least outside of the context of collective bargaining.").
See 500 US at 30-32.
Id at 30-31.
SId

at 30.

"Id.
84 See id at 30-31, citing 9 USC § 10(b).
Id at 31.
86Id.

7 See id.
'8Id at 31-32.

1998]

ArbitratingStatutory Rights

licity of the employer's discriminatory policy, and stunts the development of statutory case law.89 The Court disagreed, pointing
to the NYSE rules, which require that the awards be in writing
and contain the names of the parties, a summary of the issues,
and a description of the award.9" In addition, the summaries must
be made available to the public.9 ' Finally, the NYSE arbitration
rules permit the arbitrator to fashion equitable relief and do not
necessarily prevent collective proceedings similar to class actions.9 2
The D.C. Circuit has determined that Gilmer provides a
minimum level of procedural safeguards in arbitral proceedings."
As the D.C. Circuit phrased it, protecting Title VII rights includes, "[ait a minimum,... substantive protection and access to
a neutral forum in which to enforce those protections."' In an
employment arbitration situation, this involves the following requirements: neutral panels, adequate discovery, written opinions,
access to all forms of relief that would be available in court, and
protection from the imposition of unreasonable fees as a condition
of access to the arbitral forum.95

Id at 31.
See id at 31-32.
"Id at 32. See also Alleyne, 13 Hofstra Labor L J at 414 (cited in note 50). It is not
clear whether the Court was requiring a written opinion or had deemed the NYSE procedure sufficient to rebut Gilmer's contention that the lack of a written opinion would lead
to perverse results. Professor Alleyne claims that the Court in the cited passage was interpreting the rules as mandating a written opinion, possibly because the respondent argued in its brief that the NYSE rules required one. Id at 414 n 214. Professor Alleyne
points out that, in actuality, the NYSE rules do not mandate that a written opinion lay
out the rationale for the decision.
Gilmer, 500 US at 32.
See Cole, 105 F3d at 1482. Some commentators have criticized the Supreme Court's
conclusion that the NYSE rules provided sufficient due process for the plaintiff in Gilmer.
See Gorman, 1995 U Ill L Rev at 661 (cited in note 56) ("The Court... appears to be saying [about the limited discovery rules], somewhat cold-bloodedly, that an aggrieved employee must be prepared to suffer litigative injustice as a price of efficiency."); Megan L.
Dunphy, Comment, Mandatory Arbitration: Stripping Securities Industry Employees of
Their Civil Rights, 44 Cath U L Rev 1169 (1995) (criticizing the use of commercial arbitration rules in the public law employment discrimination context).
On a broader level, despite the Court's point by point analysis of the NYSE arbitration
procedures, it is unclear whether the Court was stating that similar rules would be required to guarantee due process or that it was possible that something less than the
NYSE standards also would be sufficient. This Comment assumes that the Gilmer Court
outlined minimal procedural requirements necessary for court enforcement of an arbitral
award.
Cole, 105 F3d at 1482.
Id.
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LABOR VERSUS EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION

Although Gilmer may have set up similar basic procedural
requirements for individual employment and collective bargaining agreement arbitration, the parties' incentives differ in the two
contexts. In the individual employment context, the arbitration
agreement is between the employer and the employee. In the
collective bargaining setting, it is the union, and not the individual employee, who stands opposite the employer at the bargaining table. This distinction is crucial in assessing mandatory labor
arbitration agreements, from both a legal and a policy perspective. The collective interest problem is only found in arbitration
evolving out of collective bargaining agreements, where the union
has control of the grievance process and hence the power to curtail an individual's statutory rights for the collective good of its
membership.
A. The Collective Interest Problem
As explained in the Steelworkers cases, the traditional rationale for labor arbitration as an institution is that it is a "substitute for industrial strife."96 Collective bargaining agreements
and the corresponding grievance machinery operate, therefore, as
a "system of industrial self-government."97 In contrast, the rationale behind commercial and employment arbitration is that it
serves as a cheaper, more efficient substitute for litigation. 98 Of
course, neither of these rationales are rigid, and the justifications
for labor and employment arbitration overlap to some degree. 9
363 US at 578.
Id at 580. Professor Stone carries the self-government metaphor further in her description of the industrial pluralism model of collective bargaining. Katherine Van Wezel
Stone, The Legacy of Industrial Pluralism:The Tension Between Individual Employment
Rights and the New Deal Collective BargainingSystem, 59 U Chi L Rev 575, 622-24
(1992). In this private "mini-democracy," there are "branches" corresponding to a working
constitutional democracy: the collective bargaining negotiations (legislature), management
(executive), and private arbitration (judiciary). Id at 623. The self-contained ideal of the
mini-government strongly suggests that the outside judiciary should not intervene and
that external law should play a very small role in the world of collective bargaining dispute resolution. Id at 623-24.
See, for example, Cole, 105 F3d at 1473 ("Arbitration of statutory claims [outside the
context of a collective bargaining agreement] is ... mostly an attempt to reduce the burdens and expenses of formal litigation."). See also Warrior & GulfNavigation Co, 363 US
at 578 ("In the commercial case, arbitration is the substitute for litigation.").
"See Frank Elkouri and Edna Asper Elkouri, How Arbitration Works 11 (BNA 4th ed
1985), quoting Harry Shulman, Reason, Contract,and Law in LaborRelations, 68 Harv L
Rev 999, 1024 (1955) ("[Labor arbitration] is designed to aid management in its quest for
efficiency, to assist union leadership in its participation in the enterprise, and to secure
justice for the employees."). See also American Manufacturing Co, 363 US at 568 ("The
processing of even frivolous claims may have therapeutic values.").
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Nevertheless, the two models-industrial self-government or an
efficient substitute-do help to explain procedural and substantive differences between the two types of arbitration. Parties to
individual employment arbitration are much less concerned about
maintaining a long-term, institutional relationship than are their
union counterparts, for whom developing the relationship is the
purpose of the institution.
While Gilmer erased many of the general judicial suspicions
about arbitration as an adequate forum for resolving statutory
employment discrimination claims, the collective interest problem inherent in labor arbitration still exists as a relevant factor."° In Gilmer, the plaintiff was an actual party to the arbitration agreement. In the union setting, however, the union, not the
employee, contracts with the employer. Indeed, the Gilmer Court
was careful to point out that the "tension between collective representation and individual statutory rights" relied upon in Alexander and its progeny was absent in the Gilmer individual employment arbitration setting.' In a more recent decision, the Supreme Court reiterated that Gilmer and Alexander are consistent
because
of the distinction between labor and employment arbitra02
1

tion.

B. The Current State of the Law: Discord in
Interpreting Gilmer
Alexander's continuing application to collective bargaining
agreements was challenged by the Fourth Circuit in Austin v
Owens-Brockway Glass Container,Inc,"' in which the court ruled
that an employee's failure to arbitrate her Title VII and ADA
claims as specified by a collective bargainingagreement precluded
her from filing suit in federal court. In a sense, the Fourth Circuit's opinion was a natural extension of Gilmer's permission to
arbitrate statutory discrimination claims. Following Gilmer, the
court placed the burden on the employee to show that Congress
did not intend to allow arbitration of Title VII and ADA claims
and concluded that she had failed to carry that burden. 4
The Austin case shared elements of both Alexander and Gilmer. Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit downplayed Alexander's
"See 500 US at 35.
101
Id.
"°'SeeLivadas v Bradshaw, 512 US 107, 127 n 21 (1994) (distinguishing Gilmer from
Alexander partly on the basis that in the collective bargaining context individual interests
can be subordinated to collective interests).
1- 78 F3d 875, 885-86 (4th Cir), cert denied, 117 S Ct 432 (1996).
4
"o
See id at 880-82.
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collective interest problem and focused instead on Gilmer's broad
presumption of final and binding arbitration of statutory
claims.0 5 Like Gilmer, Austin involved enforcement of an arbitration clause rather than the claim preclusive effects of an arbitration decision.' As in Alexander, the clause was contained in a
collective bargaining agreement, but the court emphasized that
the employee was "a party to a voluntary agreement to submit
statutory claims to arbitration." ° Additionally, the court decided
not to differentiate between a union bargaining away the right to
strike and a union bargaining for the right to arbitrate.0 8 Because the employee had agreed to arbitrate all disputes-includ-"
ing statutory claims-through her union's collective bargaining
agreement, the court concluded that the tension between collective representation and statutory rights was minimal.0 9
Since Austin, courts have reached different conclusions on
this issue. In Jessie v Carter Health Care Center, Inc,"' a Kentucky district court cited Austin approvingly in precluding a Title
VII and ADA suit from going forward after an employee failed to
arbitrate according to the terms of her union's collective bargaining agreement. The court reasoned that, post-Gilmer, arbitration can be seen as an adequate substitute for litigation. Because the union and the employee had voluntarily agreed to the
mandatory arbitration clause, it was enforceable."'
In Bush v CarrierAir Conditioning,"' however, a Texas district court expressly rejected the Austin court's reasoning and
held that Alexander, not Gilmer, applied to the collective bargaining context. Because the union had exclusive control over the
"See id at 882 n 2. The Austin court rejected what it termed the "old law," represented by Alexander, that statutory claims could not be the subject of mandatory arbitra-

tion. Id at 882.
" See id'at 885-86.
...
Id at 885.
" See id.
"See id at 882 n 2 ("Miss Austin is a party to a voluntary agreement which has explicitly agreed to the arbitration of her statutory complaints."). The court's use of the word
"voluntary" is misleading in the collective bargaining context. It is the union and the employer who produce the collective bargaining agreement, not the employee and the employer. And, as the collective bargaining agreement in Austin specified, in case of a grievance, "the Company will meet with the Local Union, and both parties will have sufficient
opportunity to express their opinions regarding an anticipated action." Id at 879, quoting
Article 38 of the collective bargaining agreement. The employee's action was only "voluntary" in the sense that she was a member of the union. Union members surely had to accept the collective bargaining agreement as a package, including the provision ceding control of the grievance process to union representatives.
11930 F Supp 1174, 1176 (E D Ky 1996).
. Id at 1176-77.
"940 F Supp 1040, 1045-46 (E D Tex 1996).
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arbitration, the court emphasized that employees faced the danger of having no forum in which to raise their Title VII claims.11
Highlighting this disagreement among the courts, the Seventh Circuit in Pryner v Tractor Supply Co"4 pointed to the "con-

ffict between majority and minority rights" and held that mandatory arbitration of statutory claims is impermissible when the
union controls the grievance proceedings. Even if the unions
themselves did not commit actionable discimination, the court
feared that they might not push as vigorously against the employer as would an injured member."' Giving control of the grievance process to the union, the court wrote, "delivers the enforcement of [minority rights] into the hands of the majority." 6
The Seventh Circuit's holding in Pryner is more consistent
with Supreme Court precedent than that of the Fourth Circuit in
Austin. The Austin court's decision to compel arbitration of an
employee's statutory discrimination claims cannot be reconciled
with the Supreme Court's recognition of the collective interest
problem. The Fourth Circuit's summary disposition of this tension in a two-sentence footnote is ultimately unsatisfying." 7
While acknowledging that the case involved a collective bargain-

ing agreement and that "there may be concern for.., tension between collective representation and statutory rights,""8 the court
concluded that the employee's explicit and voluntary agreement
to arbitrate her statutory complaints overcame that tension."'
The Austin court's reading of the arbitration clause to cover
statutory claims ignores the possibility that such a broad scope is
impermissible in the first place. As the Supreme Court has indicated, the Alexander collective interest concern remains a legitimate one. 2 ' Thus, a union's agreement to arbitrate statutory
claims cannot be enforced against its individual members. The
"'See id at 1045.
109 F3d 354, 362-63 (7th Cir), cert denied, 118 S Ct 294 (1997).
" See id.
..Idat 363. The Prynercourt read the Austin decision as standing for the proposition
that a post-dispute agreement to arbitrate is enforceable. Id. Although the exact chronology of events is not clear, it appears that the employee in Austin filed her Title VII and
ADA complaints with the EEOC after the collective bargaining agreement went into effect. Austin v Owens-Brockway Glass Container,Inc, 844 F Supp 1103, 1106-07 (W D Va
1994). Thus, the Austin agreement appears to be a union-negotiated predispute arbitration clause. The Eleventh Circuit later interpreted Austin and Pryneras standing for opposite conclusions, solidifying the circuit split. See Brisentine v Stone & Webster Engineering Corp, 117 F3d 519, 526 (11th Cir 1997).
...
See Austin, 78 F3d at 882 n 2.
i1Id.

"'See id.
See note 102 and accompanying text.
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Austin dissent follows this reasoning, stating that the employee
should be free to pursue arbitration (her contractual remedy)
or
121
litigation in federal court (her statutory remedy), or both.
In Pryner, the Seventh Circuit accurately captured the continuing Supreme Court concern over collective interest problems
in labor arbitration. The court allowed a union member's Title
VII claims to go forward in court, even though arbitration was
still pending."= The key issue was that the dispute settlement
machinery permitted only the union, and not the individual employee, to invoke arbitration."

The Seventh and Fourth Circuits do not differ on the general
presumption of arbitrability for statutory discrimination
claims." Nor would either court refuse to enforce a post-dispute
agreement by a union member to arbitrate her statutory claim."
What divides the courts is the requisite degree of control each requires the individual employee to hold over the signing of the arbitration clause and the eventual submission of the claim to arbitration. In both cases, the union signed the arbitration clause and
also controlled the dispute process. 12 Only the Seventh Circuit

found this
level of majority control over individual rights unac27
ceptable.

Following the Pryner opinion, other circuits have ruled on
the arbitrability of statutory discrimination claims in the union
setting. In Harrisonv Eddy Potash,Inc, 2 s the Tenth Circuit held
that a union member did not have to follow a specified grievance
procedure before filing a Title VII claim in federal court. Following the reasoning in Alexander, the court concluded that the collective bargaining agreement at issue covered only contractual,
not statutory rights, and rejected the Fourth Circuit's reasoning
in Austin.2 1 Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit in Brisentine v Stone
"See Austin, 78 F3d at 887 (Hall dissenting). See also Martin H. Malin, Arbitrating
Statutory Employment Claims in the Aftermath of Gilmer, 40 SLU L Rev 77, 87 (1996)
("The union's grant of exclusive representative status is key to the development of this
private self-regulating system. It also renders any suggestion that Austin voluntarily
waived her statutory right to litigate her Title VII and ADA claims simply absurd.").
'See Pryner, 109 F3d at 365.
'Id at 362-63. The court commented that post-dispute agreements to arbitrate statutory claims would be allowed as long as the worker agreed and the collective bargaining
agreement did not preclude such an arrangement. Id at 363. As mentioned in note 116,
the court interpreted the Austin decision to stand for this proposition.
"'See Pryner, 109 F3d at 363-64; Austin, 78 F3d at 880-81.
See Pryner, 109 F3d at 363; Austin, 78 F3d at 880-82.

"See Pryner,109 F3d at 355-56; Austin, 78 F3d at 877-80.
'See Pryner,109 F3d at 362-63.
112 F3d 1437, 1453-54 (10th Cir 1997).
'See id.
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& Webster Engineering Corp 0 held that a fired union member
did not have to file a grievance as outlined by his collective bargaining agreement before filing an ADA suit. The court expressly
rejected the Austin analysis, stating that Alexander was still good
law for arbitration clauses contained in collective bargaining
agreements. 3 '
In a recent Third Circuit case, Martin v Dana Corp,'32 the
court affirmed the dismissal of a Title VII suit because the union
member did not first pursue mandatory arbitration of the claim.
The court concluded that there was no collective interest problem
because under the collective bargaining agreement, an individual
union member could compel arbitration and would not have to
rely on the union to pursue his claim.3 The Third Circuit's current stance on the issue is unclear since the Martin opinion has
been vacated for rehearing en banc."
C. Other Procedural and Substantive Differences
Although the collective interest problem is perhaps the critical distinction between labor and employment arbitration, other
differences also exist, differences that favor allowing mandatory
arbitration of statutory rights in the union context. For example,
the union has a duty of fair representation that is absent in the
individual employment setting. The union breaches this duty if
"its actions
are either arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad
-3 5
faith."
One obvious advantage of labor arbitration is that the union
is familiar with the arbitration process. Unions and employers
have a great deal of experience with collective bargaining and
dispute arbitration, which helps them avoid mistakes that an in-

'"117 F3d 519, 526 (11th Cir 1997).
..
,See id at 526-27.
' 1997 WL 313054 (3d Cir 1997), vacated for rehearing en banc, 114 F3d 421 (3d Cir
1997).
131997 WL 313054 at *8.
131114 F3d at 421.
'"Air Line Pilots Association, Internationalv O Weill, 499 US 65, 67 (1991), citing
Vaca v Sipes, 386 US 171, 190 (1967). One commentator has argued that the duty of fair
representation, together with other advantages provided by the union's presence in the
arbitration, is sufficient to guarantee full statutory protection for members who are victims of employer discrimination. See Robert A. Ringler, Gilmer and Compulsory Arbitration of Employment Claims in the Union Sector: Avoiding a 'Distinction without a Difference", 47 Labor L J 147, 157-58 (1996). However, the Alexander Court noted that a breach

of this duty can be difficult to establish, especially since there is a danger that the union
itself may have discriminatory practices. See 415 US at 58 n 19 (noting that Title VII applies to unions as well as employers).
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dividual employee might make.'36 The union also can correct deficiencies in the grievance system during the next collective bargaining round." 7 The arbitrator selection process also may favor
unions over individual employees. Collective bargaining agreements often provide for a joint selection process between unions
and employers. 3 ' This mutual selection system provides each
party with veto power over the other's choice of arbitrator.'39 Securities arbitration procedures also provide a joint selection process, 40 but because unions are repeat players in arbitration (unlike individual employee complainants), they may have more expertise in selecting arbitrators. Moreover, there may be less reason to fear arbitrator bias since unions will be able to identify and
veto arbitrators who systematically rule for employers.'
Unions also are likely to have greater bargaining power than
individual employees. At least one commentator, however, has
recommended enforcing mandatory arbitration agreements in the
union context for precisely this reason.
In the nonunion context, the employees may be presented with an arbitration agreement on a take-it-or-leave-it basis as a condition of employment. Thus, the employers may be able to "structure arbitration in ways that may systematically disadvantage employees."'
Given the possibly greater protections that union employees
may have in the arbitral process, a balancing test to determine
when mandatory arbitration clauses should be enforced has a certain allure. But the Supreme Court has not approved the use of a
balancing test for determining when mandatory arbitration
clauses should be enforced."4 Nor should it do so. Union control of
the grievance process and the collective interest problem that
'See Jeanette A. Davy and George W. Bohlander, Recent Findings and Practices in
Grievance-ArbitrationProcedures,43 Labor L J 184, 184 (1992) (citing Bureau of National
Affairs study that found grievance resolution provisions in 99 percent of sampled collective
bargaining agreements).
See Ringler, 47 Labor L J at 159 (cited in note 135).
See Elkouri and Elkouri, How Arbitration Works at 135 (cited in note 99).
See Alleyne, 13 Hofstra Labor L J at 408-09 (cited in note 50).
" General Accounting Office ("GAO"), Employment Discrimination,How Registered
RepresentativesFare in DiscriminationDisputes 5-6 (1994).
"'See Ringler, 47 Labor L J at 159 (cited in note 135).
"'See Walter C. Brauer, III, Public Law and Arbitration, 43 Labor L J 547, 548-49
(1992).
"aTheSupreme Court in Gilmernoted in dicta that inequality in bargaining power between employers and employees "is not a sufficient reason to hold that arbitration agreements are never enforceable in the employment context." 500 US at 33. However, the
Court did leave open the possibility that the agreements could be unenforceable on traditional unconscionability grounds. See id.
1
, Cole, 105 F3d at 1477.
",See Section IIIA
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such control generates is still the dominant issue in the Court's
analysis of collective bargaining agreements and statutory rights
dispute resolution.'46 As long as individual union members cannot
control the fate of their complaint, statutory discrimination protection coverage will be incomplete. Arbitral due process safeguards are meaningless if the injured party cannot reach the forum in the first place.
IV.

"FIXING" LABOR ARBITRATION PROCEDURES

In light of the minimal procedural safeguards required in
Gilmer and the judicial concern over the collective interest problem, it might appear impossible to modify existing labor arbitration procedures so as to allow final and binding arbitration of
statutory employment discrimination claims. Perhaps a union
agreement mandating arbitration of members' statutory claims
will never provide sufficient protection for individual rights. Alternatively, an agreement sufficiently protective of those rights
might alter the institution of labor arbitration so that it fails to
fulfill its role as a substitute for industrial strife.
There are at least three proposals that attempt to redress the
two concerns presented above. First, courts could force employees
to exhaust the arbitration procedures for all claims, both statutory and contractual, but then subject the statutory decisions to
increased judicial scrutiny. Second, courts could allow union
members to pursue both litigation and an arbitration hearing of
their statutory claims at the same time. However, this Comment
argues that, while these two proposals adequately address the
collective interest problem, only a third solution ensures that labor arbitration will continue to be the cornerstone of industrial
relations. This third solution proposes that unions and employers
create a separate process (or track) for statutory claims within
the existing labor arbitration process. The addition of this track
would satisfy Gilmer's procedural requirements and give complainants greater control of the grievance machinery. With individuals' rights protected by this two-track system, courts could
then permit final and binding resolutions of statutory claims to
be reached in arbitration, thus preserving labor arbitration's traditional autonomy. Before describing this two-track proposal in
more detail, this Section discusses and criticizes the proposals
advocated by previous commentary.

4

" See Gilmer, 500 US at 35; Livadas v Bradshaw,512 US 107, 127 n 21 (1994).
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A. Increasing Judicial Scrutiny
Some commentators have recommended that courts allow labor arbitration of statutory claims but then subject the decisions
to increased judicial scrutiny (rather than the traditional limited
review). 47 The key concern for these commentators is that arbitrators may misapply legal concepts in coming to a final, unappealable decision.' Their proposal would allow courts greater
discretion to reexamine disputes on the merits than that granted
by the current "manifest disregard" for public law doctrine. Under this doctrine, courts may only vacate arbitration awards
reached through an egregious misapplication of public law. 49 In
short, increased judicial scrutiny of arbitration decisions could
allay concerns that arbitration is an inadequate forum for redressing statutory discrimination claims.
The problem with increased judicial review is that it asks for
too much in the wrong area. The Supreme Court already has
ruled that arbitration can be an appropriate forum for resolving
statutory claims. 50 Once parties establish a neutral forum with
the needed procedural safeguards, Gilmer demands that arbitration be allowed to go forward. Parties then would be precluded
from filing the same claim in court but would be allowed judicial
review of the award under the "manifest disregard" standard.
More fundamentally, increased judicial scrutiny will not resolve the access problem created by the union's control of the
grievance procedure. Judicial review of an arbitral decision cannot address the situation in which the union quashes an individual's complaint for the collective good of the membership. With no
arbitral decision to review, the court is powerless to rectify the
situation-hardly an adequate solution for the injured employee.
B. Allowing the Complainant to Litigate Statutory Claims
The Seventh Circuit in Pryner allowed, and the Austin dissent would have allowed, the union member to file a statutory
discrimination suit irrespective of whether she had complied with
the grievance procedures provided in the collective bargaining
agreement. 5 ' Because this procedure does not require the em-

"See, for example, Mark Berger, Can Employment Law ArbitrationWork?, 61 UMKC
L Rev 693, 718-19 (1993).
"See Harvey S. Mars, An Overview of Title I of the Americans with DisabilitiesAct
and Its Impact Upon FederalLaborLaw, 12 Hofstra Labor L J 251, 317 (1995).
"See Wilko v Swan, 346 US 427, 436 (1953).
"'See Section IL
" See Pryner,109 F3d at 365; Austin 78 F3d at 886-87 (Hal dissenting).
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ployee to exhaust arbitration remedies, it eliminates the access
problem created by union control of the grievance mechanisms.
There are, however, two key problems with this strategy.
First, while a separate action brought in court certainly would
dispose of the collective interest problem, it would also add another layer to the entire dispute resolution process. Not only
would employers and unions fail to capture any efficiencies from
arbitrating disputes, but allowing the employee two swings at his
claim creates the possibility of two different outcomes.
Second, employees may choose to forgo the grievance process
entirely, thereby damaging an integral component of the employer-union relationship. If neither employers nor unions can
rely on the agreed upon grievance procedures to settle many
claims, the foundation of labor relations may be irreparably
harmed.
C. Allowing Final Arbitration Through the Two-Track System
There exists a way to solve the collective interest problem
while taking advantage of the efficiency benefits of the arbitral
forum. Individuals should be given greater control of the grievance proceedings when statutory employment discrimination
rights are at stake. Furthermore, in such cases, the arbitral forum should observe the Gilmer procedural protections.'52 As a
corollary, once greater control and procedural safeguards are in
place, courts should continue to review the decisions of arbitral
panels with extreme deference, only reversing a decision if the
arbitrator egregiously misapplied public law, and should refuse to
allow repetitive litigation of the claims.
If the proposed two-track system is to afford sufficient protection to individual rights, certain inadequacies of labor arbitration must be rectified in order to meet the Gilmer standard. Thus
for statutory discrimination disputes, an arbitration clause
within a collective bargaining agreement should incorporate the
Gilmer procedural minimums as well as provide for retaining of
counsel at the hearing. Currently, a union complainant may not
be entitled to representation by her own attorney in arbitration
hearings.'53 In fact, many times the union itself does not have an
attorney present at the hearings, preferring instead to use business agents (often non-lawyers) to handle the grievances.'54 By
"See Section ILB.

"See Garciav Zenith Electronics Corp, 58 F3d 1171, 1179-80 (7th Cir 1995).
'" G. Richard Shell, ERISA and Other Federal Employment Statutes: When is Commercial Arbitrationan "AdequateSubstitute"for the Courts?, 68 Tex L Rev 509, 520 n 59

-
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contrast, according to the NYSE rules, individual employees can
appear with their own lawyer and control their own strategy and
tactics. 5' In addition to merely being present, the complainant's
attorney should be allowed to make oral and written arguments
to the arbitral panel.
Finally, the employee raising statutory rights claims should
be allowed to take the matter to arbitration regardless of the union's wishes. Under the current labor system, unions control access to the grievance procedures, thus making the resolution of
an employee's claim subject in part to union politics.' 56 For statutory rights of individuals, this is unacceptable."'
From an efficiency standpoint, employers may prefer the
granting of more control to individual employees during dispute
resolution to the alternative of litigation. Arbitration of statutory
rights disputes in the individual employment setting caught on
because it was streamlined, thus making it cheaper and faster
than litigation.'58 Employers enjoyed the cost savings, and employees realized that many disputes, which because of potentially
low damage awards or high attorney's fees previously would
never see the inside of a courtroom, could now be addressed in
arbitration.'59 The proposed two-track system would preserve
these advantages, which are the essence of arbitration.
(1990).
" Alleyne, 13 Hofstra Labor L J at 407 (cited in note 50), citing 2 NYSE Guide (CCH)
§§ 2600-38 at 4311-30 (1995).
'Professor Shell notes that the rate at which grievances reach the final stage of arbitration is related to the quality of the relationship between the union and the employer. If
there are current problems, almost all grievances end up in arbitration. See Shell, 68 Tex
L Rev at 520 n 53 (cited in note 154). See also David E. Feller, A General Theory of the
Collective BargainingAgreement, 61 Cal L Rev 663, 752-53 (1973) (commenting that political considerations within the union affect the rate of grievances carried through to arbitration).
'See Section m.C. The access problem and procedural safeguards outlined in Gilmer
are the critical issues to be addressed in reforming the labor arbitration system. There
remains a conflict of interest danger in choosing arbitrators, because the union and employer control the selection process, while the employee has no input in the choice. See
text accompanying notes 138-42. Because securities arbitration rules allow the employee
to strike prospective arbitrators for cause, union employees also should have the ability to
strike arbitrators for cause in order to match the rules that the Supreme Court approved
in Gilmer.
'See, for example, Robert Perkovich, Does Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.
Compel the Considerationof ExternalLaw in LaborArbitration?, 25 Stetson L Rev 53, 6667 (1995); Richard A. Bales, Compulsory Arbitrationof Employment Claims: A Practical
Guide to Designing and Implementing Enforceable Agreements, 47 Baylor L Rev 591, 593
(1995).
See Bales, 47 Baylor L Rev at 593. See also Mei L. Bickner, Christine Ver Ploeg, and
Charles Feigenbaum, Developments in Employment Arbitration, 52 Dispute Resolution J
8, 78-79 (Jan 1997) (summarizing employer survey results that found that most employers
surveyed adopted arbitration procedures due to concerns about litigation costs). There is
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The addition of the procedural safeguards need not negate
the cost savings of arbitration. The Gilmer procedural safeguards
are not as extensive as those found in full-blown litigation. For
example, formal discovery is a major component of trial expense,
and replacing it with the reduced discovery procedures that were
approved in Gilmer would save both time and money." ° Furthermore, employers can avoid the risk of large jury damage awards
by going through arbitration instead of litigation. 6'
If the union and employer have set up the arbitration process
in this manner, the union should have the power to agree to the
collective bargaining agreement and bind all of its members to
the agreement's terms. As long as the individual has control of
the grievance process for statutory discrimination claims, the system adequately addresses the Supreme Court's collective interest
concern. Finally, if the Court did approve a two-track system, the
Court would not necessarily have to overrule Alexander. Alexander now stands for the narrow proposition that the Court will not
allow arbitral preclusion of statutory discrimination due to the
collective interest problem found in the union setting. Since the
two-track system solves the problem, mandatory and final labor
arbitration of statutory claims then may go forward.
D. Destroying Labor Arbitration?
Even if efficiency considerations push for a two-track system
with no recourse to the courts, critics may argue that the system
would eviscerate labor arbitration as an institution. One of the
foundations of collective bargaining is the understanding that unions not individual members should control the internal grievance process. Inserting a second track runs the risk of throwing
the baby out with the bathwater, a risk that might be avoided by
allowing the complainant to take the claim entirely outside of the
grievance process.' 2 While the critics are correct in holding the

one caveat to the employer's preference for arbitration on efficiency grounds. If it turns out
that employees are much more likely to file a claim in arbitration as opposed to a civil
suit, increased control by individual employees may lead to greater costs for the employer.
'"Terry A. Bethel, Wrongful Discharge: Litigation or Arbitration?, 1993 J Dispute
Resolution 289, 296-97 (identifying informal discovery procedures as partial reason for
relative expedience and inexpensiveness oflabor arbitration when compared to litigation);
Ronald Turner, Compulsory Arbitrationof Employment DiscriminationClaims with Special Reference to the Three A's: Access, Adjudication, and Acceptability, 31 Wake Forest L
Rev 231, 285-86 (1996) ("The time and costs incurred by the employer are high where the
employer responds to plaintiffs discovery in document intensive discrimination cases.").
...
See Turner, 31 Wake Forest L Rev at 284 (noting that recent changes in discrimination law have increased employers' vulnerability to large jury verdicts).
"2InPryner, Judge Posner stated offhandedly that the court was "given no reason to
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labor arbitration system in high esteem, a two-track system
would not unduly harm the institution. It presents the better alternative for employers and unions, while ensuring adequate protection of individual employees.
The legal issue of the collective interest problem is distinct
from the policy question, which asks what proposal is better for
labor relations. Both of the proposed solutions to the problemallowing litigation of statutory claims and the two-track systemwould be legally satisfactory. But only the two-track system adequately addresses the labor policy concerns.
Union control of grievances is recognized by the courts as a
traditional characteristic of labor arbitration. For run-of-the-mill
grievances, the union member clearly does not have the right to
unilaterally invoke arbitration. The Supreme Court outlined the
policy rationales behind this position in Vaca v Sipes," stating
that to grant the employee an absolute right to invoke arbitration
would "substantially undermine[ I" the dispute settlement
mechanism, "destroying the employer's confidence in the union's
authority and returning the individual grievant to the vagaries of
the independent and unsystematic negotiation."' In addition,
unchecked union members would file many more grievances, increasing costs and burdening the grievance process so as to "prevent it from functioning successfully."' 65 As the Court concluded,
such measures would throw into doubt "whether the parties to
collective bargaining agreements would long continue to provide
for detailed grievance and arbitration procedures of the kind encouraged by [the Labor Management Relations Act] § 203 (d) .... .'6
Moreover, the Supreme Court's doctrine as expressed in Vaca
predicts that, if statutory discrimination claims do comprise a
large percentage of all claims, and especially if discrimination
hearings generally are the most acrimonious sort of proceedings,
allowing an exception to union control could lead to damaging
consequences for labor relations.'6 7 Statutory discrimination
believe that the ability of unionized workers to enforce their statutory rights outside of the
grievance machinery established by collective bargaining agreements is undermining labor relations." 109 F3d at 363. For the reasons outlined in this Comment, a closer examination of relevant policy considerations leads to the conclusion that keeping enforcement
within the grievance machinery is the better alternative.
386 US 171, 191 (1967).
164Id.

"'Idat 191-92.
" Id at 192. Labor Management Relations Act § 203(d), 61 Stat 153 (1947), codified at
29 USC § 173(d) (1994), reads, "[flinal adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties
is declared to be the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the
application or interpretation of an existing collective bargaining agreement."
'See 386 US at 191-93.

1998]

ArbitratingStatutory Rights

claims presently comprise a limited percentage of grievances, but
that figure is likely to increase in the coming years and produce a
corresponding rise in the demand for arbitrators.'6 8 The trend is
predicted because Congress only recently enacted the Civil Rights

Act of 1991 and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and
larger numbers of people are just now coming within the protection of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.'8 9 One source
calculated that the number of employment discrimination cases
rose by more than 2000 percent from 1970 to 1989.170 It seems
likely that the wave of employment discrimination complaints in
the nonunion sector will be paralleled by a similar increase
within the collective bargaining context.
If this is the case, statutory employment discrimination disputes will dominate the grievance process. Allowing a member to
control statutory discrimination claims could lead to the loss of
union control of the dispute machinery, as well as a reduction in
union bargaining power.'' The greater number of discrimination
grievances taken to arbitration may create greater friction in the
employer-union relationship, further endangering the collective
bargaining balance.
However, despite the disadvantages of loosening union control of the grievance process, federal discrimination laws must be
enforced. 72 While the union's interest in preserving its relationship with the employer is strong, so is the individual employee's
interest in protection from discriminatory practices.7 3 Moreover,
t

" See Walter J. Gershenfeld, New Roles for Labor Arbitrators, in Gladys W. Gruenberg, ed, Arbitration 1994, Controversy and Continuity: Proceedingsof the Forty-Seventh
Annual Meeting NationalAcademy ofArbitrators275, 278 (BNA 1994) (noting new federal
legislation encouraging alternative dispute resolution and predicting a backlog of unresolved EEOC cases).
"See James-A. King, Jr., et al, Agreeing to Disagree on EEO Disputes, 9 Labor Law
97, 97-98 (1993). See also Bales, 47 Baylor L Rev at 593 n 9 (cited in note 158) ("The
EEOC currently has a backlog of almost 88,000 claims, 99.5% of which it will not litigate
on behalf of the claimant."), citing GAO, EEOC's Expanding Workload: Increases in Age
Discriminationand Other ChargesCall for New Approach 13 (1994).
...
John J. Donohue DI and Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment
DiscriminationLitigation, 43 Stan L Rev 983, 985-86 (1991) (using data obtained from the
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts).
.See Garciav Zenith ElectronicsCorp, 58 F3d 1171, 1176 (7th Cir 1995) (noting that
even during an individual grievance procedure, the union's credibility and bargaining
power are at stake).
"Alexander, 415 US at 51 ('There can be no prospective waiver of an employee's
rights under Title VII .... Title VIIs strictures are absolute and represent a congressional command that each employee be free from discriminatory practices.").
'"The two interests are to some degree mutually exclusive. Professor Stone argues
that while statutory individual employment rights could be seen as "perfectly compatible
with the system of collective bargaining," the promise of their beneficial effect on collective
bargaining has not been fulfilled and indeed, there actually may have been negative ef-
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while the danger to industrial relations caused by the predicted
rise of claims is a real one, the two-track system minimizes this
danger, especially when compared to litigation. After all, the
question is not whether statutory claims may be adjudicated, but
in which forum. If the two-track mechanism is not implemented,
individual employees will continue to file claims in the already
gridlocked court system, with all the drawbacks for employers
and employees that litigation entails. Neither the two-track system nor available litigation will leave unions in control of the
grievance. Arbitration, at least, will ease the gridlock, delay, and
direct conflict between employer and employee.
This Comment has argued that courts should prefer a twotrack system as a solution to the collective interest problem in
statutory discrimination. But it remains to be demonstrated that
employers and unions will voluntarily adopt such a system. Employers may worry that a two-track arbitration system could collapse into a de facto single-track system. Complainants could attempt to hook their grievances onto an employment discrimination claim, thereby invoking the enhanced procedures and control.
There are two responses to this criticism. First, some disputes simply cannot be classified as statutory discrimination
claims. Disagreements over job classifications, type of work performed, and an employer's decision to contract work out to nonunion employees fall into this category." Second, if employers do
not agree to a two-track system, employees will have the right to
take their statutory discrimination claims to court. Although under Title VII employees are required to petition the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") before filing a
statutory discrimination suit, if the EEOC does not file suit
within 180 days, the employee is free to proceed to court within
the next 90 days." 5 Arbitration versus litigation-with all of its
attendant expenses and delays-is the fundamental choice facing
employers when they decide whether or not to adopt a two-track
system.
It may also appear that unions would oppose giving greater
control to individual members. Unions are in a different position
than employers; if the dispute is litigated, they would not incur
fects. Stone, 59 U Chi L Rev at 576-77 (cited in note 97). Such negative effects emerge because federal labor law regulating collective bargaining often preempts the newly strong
federal
individual employment rights at the state level. Id at 593-96.
17
4

Id.

'42
160).

USC 2000e-5(f)(1) (1964); Turner, 31 Wake Forest L Rev at 281 (cited in note
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legal expenses on behalf of individual employees. In addition,
giving up any degree of control could weaken their negotiating
strength in the collective bargaining process. If any statutory discrimination claim could be arbitrated at the behest of the complainant, the union would lose an important bargaining chip. Additionally, a two-track system could lessen the union's ability to
regulate industrial relations and look out for the collective interest of the members as a whole.
However, like employers, unions should consider the alternatives. The Supreme Court has established that individual members must be given control of their statutory claims, either in the
arbitration process or in the court system. Courts will not permit
unions to return to the world in which they could settle statutory
grievances before the commencement of arbitration, leaving the
employee stuck with the result.
The proposed two-track modification to the grievance procedure may well be more palatable to the unions than the alternative of sending all statutory discrimination claims to the courts.
First, if the employers favor a two-track mechanism in order to
allow binding arbitration of statutory claims, unions likely could
bargain for concessions elsewhere. Second, the unions have an interest in keeping disputes "in house" and containing grievances
within the traditional labor arbitration machinery. The dispute
resolution procedure contained in a collective bargaining agreement is the end product of a mutual negotiation between the unions and the employer. Although union power would be somewhat
weakened because the union would not have the ability to cut
short the grievance process for statutory discrimination claims,
allowing complainants to circumvent internal procedures completely would undermine union control even further. Third, unions may appreciate the efficiency rationales for arbitration as a
substitute for litigation, especially if disputes would be resolved
more quickly. Finally, if members were given more control of
statutory discrimination complaints, the union would be able to
avoid a certain amount of litigation over breaches of its duty of
fair representation. A two-track system would allow individual
employment rights to complement collective bargaining rights,
thus strengthening labor power by setting a floor for negotiations.'76
.. Stone, 59 U Chi L Rev at 576-77 (cited in note 97). Stone also points out that
"greater individual employment rights might also remove sources of conflict within unions" since "externally imposed employment terms represent tradeoffs made by a legislature or court, rather than by unions... [sparing] the unions the potentially divisive effects of making such decisions themselves." Id at 577.
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In addition to the two-track system's effect on industrial relations, it boasts the added advantage of using a single procedure
to resolve the discrimination claim. Under the Pryner view,'
which would allow both arbitration and litigation to proceed
separately, there remains the possibility of contrary outcomes.
Keeping the dispute within the confines of the arbitral system
makes the arbitral decision final, thereby increasing predictability in the dispute resolution process.
It is important to keep in mind what the two-track proposal
does not do. It does not require employers or unions to resort to
litigation and its attendant expenses. It does not deprive the individual employee of her statutory rights. It does not give independent control of all grievances to the employee. And, given the
alternatives, it does not unduly undermine the system of labor
arbitration.
CONCLUSION

In order for mandatory arbitration clauses in collective bargaining agreements to be enforced for statutory discrimination
claims, employers and unions must address the judicial concern
over the collective interest problem. A two-track dispute settlement mechanism in which individual members possess greater
control over the grievance process for statutory discrimination
claims would dissipate the concern over this problem. While setting up such a system does pose some threat to the integrity of
the labor dispute resolution mechanism, the alternative of separate and protracted litigation would be considerably more damaging to employer-union relations.

'See

109 F3d at 362-63.

